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From 1976 on the inward-oriented growth strategy that had prevailed in Argentina since 
the 1940s definitively ceased to underlie economic policy making. Alternative roads to economic 
growth were favoured and pursued, but in fact this policy transition, which came after ten years 
of uninterrupted growth (1964-1974), ushered in a long period of decadence. Stagnation was 
accompanied by pervasive inflation. In 1990 GNP was below the 1975 level; GNP per capita 
declined at an average annual rate of -1.4% between 1976 and 1989;l and the GDP and 
employment shares of manufacturing fell. In spite of an increase in the profit share after 1976, 
a combination of widespread financial speculation, conspicuous consumption, interest payments 
on the external debt and massive capital flight conspired to depress the rate of investment in 
productive equipment, which plummeted in 1981-83 (-18.2% per year), and continued to fall 
between 1983 and 1989 at an average annual rate of -5.1 %. The transfer of savings abroad was 
at the expense of wage income, and the fall of labour's income share largely exceeded the 
increase in the rate of gross savings (Marshall, 1993a). 
These severe problems were addressed by a number of consecutive stabilization plans, 
some of which achieved momentary success, as was the case with the TheterodoxTM Austral Plan 
of 1985. in 1991-93 yet another economic programme, agreed with the IMF, was implemented. 
It rested on deregulation, a tight fiscal policy and large-scale privatization, a fixed exchange rate 
and the opening up of the economy to imported manufactures. One important aim, attained in 
1992, was Argentina's incorporation in the Brady Plan for the re-negotiation of the foreign debt. 
The economic programme was applied thoroughly, and had deep, both positive and negative, 
impacts in a relatively short period. Stabilization was achieved and maintained throughout these 
years. High interest rates ensured a continuous inflow of foreign exchange, essential to maintain 
the exchange rate fixed in 1991. Cuts in government expenditure, the increase of tax revenues 
and, particularly, privatizations eased the fiscal deficit. Economic activity, including 
manufacturing, recovered. GNP boomed during two consecutive years at rates near 9%; in 1991 
it reached, and in 1992 finally surpassed the 1980 level.2 in contrast to these positive effects the 
explosion of imports due to trade liberalization measures resulted in a growing trade balance 
deficit even though exports, including non-traditional manufacturing goods, were showing an 
upward trend initiated in 1988. At the time of writing this paper, early 1994, the economic 
programme still is underway and inflation is under control. In 1993 growth rates, although still 
high, decelerated, particularly in manufacturing, and the economic debate's central concern is 
whether it will be possible to go beyond mere recovery and resume sustained growth or not. 
Data from Central Bank (BCRA) and CEPAL (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America). 
2 See table Al, Appendix. Investment also increased, but while in the 1980s machinery had explained about 
31% of gross fixed investment (with the exception of 1982-83 when it fell to 27-28%; in CEPAL, Indicadores 
macroeconOmicos de Ia Argentina, Buenos Aires, October, 1991; 1988-90 preliminary figures), a 1994 study 
made in the union of manufacturing employers holds that only 19.4% of fixed investment in 1992 can be 
assigned to machinery, and that only a segment of this latter portion is machinery for production (Página 12, 
Economic Supplement, January 30, 1994). 
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The long 1976-1993 period witnessed changes in the supply of labour, such as the 
decrease of internal migration to industrial centres, the growth of female labour force 
participation rates and an overall improvement in education. The structure of labour demand also 
experienced substantial modification: relative fall of employment in manufacturing and 
construction, and expansion of employment in small sized firms; changes in skills demanded; 
increase in the presence of women in the employed labour force due not only to their own larger 
labour force participation rate but also to changes in the structure of demand; expansion of 
precarious forms of employment, as a more extensive use of temporary labour was made and, 
due to widespread evasion of payroll taxes, less and less workers were 'under the coverage of 
social security institutions, in addition, unemployment increased and real wages deteriorated. The 
mechanisms of wage determination also changed, as is discussed below. Mirroring these 
processes, income distribution became more uneven. The climax was reached in 1989, when 
inequality, unemployment and poverty were intensified by hyperinflation in the midst of political 
turmoil. 
Many of these labour market and distributional changes may be traced back to the state's 
active intervention through its social and economic policy instruments. In the context of their 
envisaged economic growth strategies as well as their shorter term stabilization goals, the 
successive governments inter alia manipulated wages and dealt with trade unions and collective 
bargaining, devised stimuli for manufacturing exports, reformed the tax system and decided on 
the level and composition of public expenditure. Though not all of the measures taken brought 
the desired results, they had direct and indirect effects on labour demand and supply, the 
distribution of income, and living standards. In particular, I will argue that governments' views 
on the economic role of wages and the subsequent policy choices - pre and post debt crisis and 
"adjustment" - were one major factor behind the increase in inequality. To this determinant were 
added the effects of pervasive economic stagnation and its sequel of unemployment growth and 
weakened trade union, and of the acceleration of inflation. At least since the 1930s the state had 
intervened in the process of wage determination in different forms, and wages had been 
repeatedly controlled by the state (Cortés and Marshall, 1993a), but from 1976 to 1988 they were 
administered systematically and without the interruption of periods of free wage bargaining. 
The aim of this paper is to highlight the major labour market and distributional effects 
of policies implemented from the mid 1970s on, paying special attention to the economic 
programme applied in 1991-93. Three years undoubtedly is too short a period to permit gauging 
accurately the impacts of the latter programme, but one can note certain patterns which appear 
to be superimposed over long term, structural tendencies. In any case, only the resumption of 
stable economic growth will permit a disentangling of the ephemeral changes from those that are 
more permanent. 
In what follows, the central policy measures applied in each period as well as the 
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economic strategies behind them are succinctly reviewed; a more detailed account is provided 
for the 1991-1993 programme. Next, labour market trends are examined and an attempt is made 
to identify policy impacts on the volume and structure of the labour supply and on labour 
requirements. Wages and income distribution are then analyzed and, finally, the distributional 
effects of changes in taxation and social expenditure are discussed. 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRAMMES, 1976-1993 
The military government's (1976-1983) neoliberal economic programme was an attempt 
to overcome the constraints faced by inward-oriented industrialization (market size, external 
restrictions, high levels of protection) in the context of the new international order (Cortés and 
Marshall, 1993). Wage cuts, trade liberalization and the financial reform were intended to foster 
growth, modernize the economy and bring inflation under control. The reduction of labour costs 
was considered to he indispensable for restoring growth. However, a short-lived period of 
investment growth (1977-1980) was soon followed by dropping investment levels. Trade 
liberalization (1979-1981), which had been expected to encourage the modernization of 
Argentinian manufacturing and to increase its external competitiveness, led instead, together with 
the over-valuation of the Argentine currency and high interest rates, to the dismantling of 
manufacturing industries (Kosacoff, 1993). Easy international credit contributed to an 
unprecedented growth of external indebtedness that, to make matters worse, was matched by 
capital flight rather than by increased domestic investment. The GNP share of the public sector 
not decline despite the rhetoric on "state's subsidiarity" and the need to curtail state 
expenditure. In brief, the economic programme was not successful, and this period ended with 
the stagnation of manufacturing and a large fiscal deficit due to state's adoption of the 
overwhelming privately-incurred external debt. 
In relation to the labour market, the military government fixed wages, repressed trade 
unions and eliminated collective bargaining as well as the right to strike, and reformed the labour 
code to the detriment of workers and Marshall, 1993). In 1976, money wages, thought 
to be at an "artificially" high level due to trade union intervention, were frozen while prices were 
liberalized. Wage policy aimed also at increasing wage dispersion, that was considered to have 
been excessively narrowed due to trade union interference; wage disparities now were expected 
to stimulate labour mobility, reflect productivity differentials across firms and segment further 
the labour force in order to undermine the basis of centralized collective negotiation and union 
strength (Marshall, 1988a). Measures to widen wage differentials were applied also within the 
public sector. 
Tax reforms of this period included a raise of personal contributions to social security; 
the elimination of employer payroll taxes for the state pension scheme and for the public housing 
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fund, revenues which were replaced by the generalization of the value added tax; tax exemptions 
to personal income out of distributed profits; and a shift to taxes that can be more easily passed 
on to the consumer. With taxation on income and profits representing only 10% of taxation 
revenues, Argentina's tax structure already was, by international standards, extremely regressive, 
and this characteristic was exacerbated by the reforms.3 The pressure of direct and indirect 
taxation on labour income increased (Marshall, 1988a). 
The Radical-party government elected by the end of 1983. under president Alfonsmn, 
initially had planned to base economic growth on the increase of manufacturing exports, but 
inflation and trade balance difficulties soon led it to give priority to price stability and obtaining 
foreign exchange for servicing the external debt inherited from the previous government by way 
of reducing consumption so as cut imports and expand exports. Its programmes centred in 
stabilization plans against inflation and balance-of-payment disequilibria (Cortés and Marshall, 
1993), while efforts were being made to re-negotiate debt repayment conditions. The so-called 
"heterodox" stabilization plan known as the Austral Plan, that in principle implied wage and 
price control, was launched in 1985; as its success in curbing inflation lasted only two years, it 
was followed by new stabilization packages, that proved unable to check the acceleration of the 
rate of price increase. Besides, government incentives failed to stimulate firms to invest as 
expected. Schemes to promote investment and growth of manufacturing exports in the form of 
tax exemptions were often utilized in a fraudulent way. Investment continued to fall, and 
domestic capital held abroad did not return. The government term concluded with the deepening 
of the crisis and hyperinflation.4 
The labour policy of the Radical government centred on wage control. Reinstatement of 
collective bargaining did not encompass wage negotiation until 1988. Wages were administered 
up to 1988 on the assumption that wage increases would bring about balance-of-payment 
difficulties by reducing the export surplus and expanding imports, and would accelerate inflation 
due to the "premature overheating" of the economy (Marshall, 1989). 
Among the main taxation reforms were the elimination of the earlier extension of the 
value added tax to wage goods; the reinstatement of employer payroll taxes for the state pension 
scheme though at less than their historical level; measures to improve the control of tax evasion; 
Taxes on income and profits dropped from 9.6% of tax revenues in 1972 to 5.4% in 1981; figures for 
industrialized countries were, respectively, 41.4% and 38.7%, and for Latin America and the Caribbean, 21.7% 
and 19,4% (data from Petrei, 1984). 
' 
See in/er a/ia Canitrot (1992) on factors behind the failures of the 1976-83 and 1984-89 programmes, in 
relation to the latier he emphasizes the combination of structural vulnerability (the ways in which the fiscal 
deficit had to be financed) with political events. 
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specific taxes on sales of fuels, gas and telephone services to provide funds for social security; 
and the creation of the "forced savings" scheme, a temporary tax on personal incomes above a 
stipulated threshold. These measures were not sufficient to alter the global regressiveness of the 
taxation system (Marshall, 1993a).5 Taxes on personal income increased, hut only from 5.5% 
of total taxes collected in 1983 to 6.2% in 1988, and from 1.0% ofGNP to l.2%.6 
The Justicialismo won the next elections (mid 1989), and this new government under 
president Menem adopted neoliberal views once again, as earlier had the military government 
of 1976-83. After several failed attempts at reducing inflation,7 a new economic programme was 
applied beginning in 1991. It implied a radical transformation of the "rules of the game" 
traditional in Argentina's economy. Having some points in common with policies put in practice 
by Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz during the military regime, the new programme also had 
its own special features. Moreover, ideas that earlier had not been implemented fully now were 
carried out thoroughly and more coherently. In this sense, this was a new economic strategy, that 
assigned a new role to the state, and represented a real fracture with the past. 
The foundations on which this programme was based included convertibility of the 
Argentine currency, reduction of the fiscal deficit through both cutting expenditure and increasing 
tax revenues, and deregulation of markets. Ultimate objectives were modernization, and the 
growth of savings, investment and productivity. Trade liberalization was perceived mainly as an 
stabilization device, but one which would eventually serve to increase productivity and the 
competitiveness of Argentine manufactures. Although wages were not controlled directly by the 
wage policy was to encourage decentralization of wage bargaining and to subordinate wage 
raises to productivity increases. 
The Plan de Converribili dad of early 1991 was the centre piece of the government's 
economic programme, designed to curb inflation. Its main characteristics were strict control of 
monetary emission, a fixed exchange rate with the US dollar (Ito 1) and a monetary base backed 
by international reserves (gold, foreign exchange, and similar); indexation was prohibited. This 
plan, enacted by law, helped reestablish confidence in the Argentinian currency, totally shaken 
by the hypennflation of 1989 and the failure of previous stabilization packages. Although certain 
prices (e.g. of private services) continued to rise visibly, inflation gradually subsided; first 
In 1986 the impact of taxation on family income (26.1 %), although quite similar in all income classes, 
was not completely neutral but was highest on the poorest decile (29.3%), followed by the second lowest and 
the top deciles (27%) (Santiere, 1989; see this study for further details as well as for a note of caution on tax 
incidence on the poorest decile). 
6 According to figures in Carciofl (1990). 
On these earlier programmes see e.g. Canitrot (1992). 
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wholesale prices and later the consumer price index showed the favourable impact of this 
programme: between December 1992 and December 1993 consumer prices rose by 7.4%. 
Partly in the framework of the MERCOSUR treaty agreed to earlier, and partly as a result 
of generalized rebates of import duties,8 the opening up of Argentina to manufactures from 
abroad broke the long established pattern of manufacturing protection, that had been challenged 
only at the turn of the 1970s by means of similar, albeit short-lived measures. The result of the 
trade liberalization, together with the dollar fixed by the Convertibility law and 
maintained by the inflow of foreign capital that responded to high interest rates, was a dramatic 
surge of imports, that much more than trebled between 1990 and 1993 generating an important 
trade balance deficit (-2,636,800,000 dollars in 1992, -3,695,600,000 in 
The fiscal deficit was to be tackled by reducing expenditure and increasing tax 
revenues.'0 To cut down expenditure a vast privatization programme was envisaged, and 
measures were taken to reorganize and modernize the state structure and reduce public-sector 
employment. This latter was to be helped by ad hoc international loans. The GNP share of public 
expenditure, including the service on the public debt, averaged 32.6% in 1980-83, 31.1% in 
1984-88, 27.7% in 1989 and 26.8% in 1993 (Vargas de Flood and Harriague, 1993). 
Starting with the hasty privatization of the Argentinian airline and of the telephone 
system, the process proceeded quickly and by 1993 a large number of formerly state enterprises 
were in private hands, often owned jointly by domestic and foreign capital: water and sewage, 
electricity, oil, gas, telephones, railways and the underground transit system, roads, steel works, 
as well as many others. The Argentine state shared ownership in some of them; some were 
leased on a long term basis. 
Tax reforms were devised with a view to generating genuine resources for the state. They 
were based on changes in the structure of taxation, a reorganization of the system so as to foster 
registration (centralization and simplification of procedures) and a vast campaign among the 
population against the overwhelmingly widespread tax evasion.1' One of the most important of 
'More details on import tariffs are in the official document "Argentina en Crecimie,uo", Ministeno de 
Economla y Obras y Servicios Ptiblicos, Buenos Aires, n.d. 
Data from Instituto Nacional de EstadIstica y Censos (INDEC), Informacidn de Prensa, 1994 (figures for 
1993 are preliminary). 
10 For details and summary of all measures taken see "Argentina en Crecimiento". op. cit. 
Government efforts to control evasion have no earlier precedent: advertising through the media, a 
denouncing campaign, more inspections, benefits to compliers, lotteries, stronger penalties to evaders, etc. 
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tax reforms was the generalization and increase of the value added tax, on the grounds that this 
tax would be easier to collect. Government effort met with some success; registration rose 
substantially and tax revenues increased from 15.1% of GNP in 1989 to 18.1 % in 1992.12 
The development of the capital market and other incentives failed to increase savings and 
investment as much as the government had envisaged for the purpose of resuming economic 
growth. Despite the stagnation of real wages and employment, consumption increased from 79% 
of GNP to 83% between 1990 and 1992 (table A, Appendix), fostered by the re-appearance of 
consumer credit due to stabilization and increase in confidence, the opening up to cheap imports 
together with an unsatisfied demand for foreign consumer goods, and the growth of conspicuous 
consumption. The expansion of private consumption undermined official attempts at reviving 
domestic savings. In this context, the privatization of the retirement pension scheme was intended 
not only to reduce public expenditure but also to force savings out of wages. This reform, 
according to which the private system will coexist with the public scheme and workers will have 
the right to opt between them, is only to start working in 1994. In addition, by the end of 1993 
an official decree reduced or eliminated (depending on the firm's location) payroll taxes of 
manufacturing enterprises for the social security system (retirement, health care, and family 
allowances); allegedly this was to increase investment and employment.'3 
Apart from the privatization of the retirement scheme and the reduction of payroll taxes, 
the system of obras sociales has been under discussion. This system provides health and other 
services (such as tourism, consumption cooperatives and sports) to workers. It rests on the 
compulsory contributions of workers and employers to each economic activity's obra, which is 
managed by the corresponding trade union; state centralization of the system ensures however 
redistribution of funds among the obras if necessary. As a central source of revenues (9% of the 
wage bill, adding up worker and employer taxes), it is the traditional stronghold of trade unions, 
and as such it was repeatedly attacked by governments since the 1960s. Official projects proposed 
the elimination of forced affiliation to the obra of the industry of employment, in order to 
facilitate free election of coverage. Liberalization would give workers the right to choose among 
obras and, eventually, to opt for private insurance schemes for health care, helping undermine 
the main source of economic power of the trade unions. 
12 "Argentina en crecimiento", op. cit., table 4. The number of persons registered increased in 1989-92 by 
78% in the case of taxes on profits, and by 327% in the case of the VAT, and the amount collected rose 
concomitantly (ibid.: 12). 
In the words of the Secretary of Economic Programming . . ." with the very low wage levels in some 
provinces and a 60% discount in payroll taxes, labour costs in some areas of Argentina are today similar to 
Chile's"; this, added to reduction in energy costs for manufacturing "will make investment attractive" (in 
12, February 1st, 1994; translation AM). 
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The controversial national employment law approved by the end of 1991 after lengthy 
discussions'4 was expected to encourage employment growth and reduce youth unemployment 
with "promoted" temporary contractual modalities; it also was designed to reduce clandestine 
employment, and stipulated a limited unemployment insurance scheme. As this law failed to 
stimulate employment creation, the 1993 official project of a new labour code,'5 to be discussed 
in Parliament in early 1994, included a wide-ranging variety of de-regulating measures, involving 
the employment contract, dismissal, working time, etc.,'6 that were supposed to foster 
investment and employment growth because they were basically designed to satisfy employers' 
demands. 
in 1991, to ensure stabilization and to reduce labour costs, resirictions were placed on 
wage increments agreed through collective bargaining, which were now permissible only if 
backed by effective or expected productivity increases ("productivity agreements").'7 With 
similar aims, the decentralization of collective bargaining was promoted through a decree of 
1993. 
THE LABOUR MARKET 
1. Labour supply 
Social and economic policies had impacts on the volume and siructure of the supply of 
labour other than those that were exerted through changes in labour demand. In particular, state- 
administered wage levels affected female labour force participation rates, state controlled 
retirement pensions influenced the labour market participation of older age groups, housing 
policy modified internal and international migration trends, and state fixed exchange rates had 
14 Trade union and labour lawyers argued that it would legitimize precarious forms of employment and 
foster temporary employment at the expense of indefinite contracts. Employers found this law insufficient, as it 
did not satisfy their demands for greater deregulation of the employment contract, and too complicated, with 
many regulations which required trade union approval. 
This followed several attempts in the same direction, successively discarded due to widespread opposition. 
16 This list is not exhaustive; among other changes in labour legislation, limitations to the right to strike in 
essential services were decreed in 1990; the law on work injuries was modified to reduce costs; and collective 
bargaining in the public sector was allowed. 
At the time of writing, there is still an ongoing controversy on how productivity increases should be 
estimated. 
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an impact on the volume of immigration from neighbouring These policies 
structured the supply of labour, as they modified its gender and age composition, as well as its 
composition according to place of origin; their effects were superimposed over structural trends. 
Obviously, labour force participation rates and migration trends are influenced also by other 
socio-economic factors and labour market conditions, and in practice it may he difficult to isolate 
the specific impact of those policies. 
During the 1970s labour force participation rates tended to decline. Men's labour force 
participation continued its longer-term falling tendency, while female participation stagnated after 
substantial growth in the previous decade. Lack of employment opportunities intensified the 
labour market exit of male workers, as reflected in the fall in the activity rate of adult men of 
working age heading households 1985); as we will see this contributed to maintain 
unemployment rates low. The stagnation of women's participation rates was the outcome of the 
contrasting behaviour of the youngest and oldest segments, whose labour market participation 
dropped, and of adult women, aged 25-54, whose participation increased'9 to compensate for 
the job and income loss of the household head. 
In the 1 980s and early I 990s women continued to enter the labour market in larger 
numbers (table B, Appendix).2° Overall labour force participation tended to rise (table 1A) 
owing to the renewed growth of female labour force participation. Fragmented evidence suggests 
that the latter increased, among other factors, because many women from low-income 
households, mainly spouses,21 faced with low wages and the unemployment of adult male 
heads, entered the labour market to supplement family income. As a result, in Buenos 
Aires, the share of women and, after 1990, of household members other than the main 
1E Naturally, education policy should be expected to affect the educational structure of the labour force. In 
this case, the growing deterioration of the public education system was not reflected by the usual educational 
indicators, as these show rising schooling rates, the educational upgrading of the population, and declining drop 
out rates (population census, 1980 and 1991). 
19 Population Census data, 1960, 1970 and 1980. Data refer to population aged 14 and over. In the 1970s 
labour force participation rates fell in all age groups except for those aged 35-44 (whose participation increased) 
and 45-54 (whose participation did not change). 
20 These data are for Buenos Aires. In 1993 the increase of female participation was sharp. For some, 
women's larger participation was the sequel to the substantial growth of male unemployment and to pervasively 
low earnings. For others, quite the contrary, unemployment had mounted as a consequence of the rising 
participation of women. 
21 Jumps in the labour force participation rate of women in both 1986 and 1992-93 in Buenos Aires were 
due more to women aged 35 and over than to younger groups (data in INDEC, Información de Prensa, May and 
October 1993). 
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breadwinner in the economically active population (EAP) increased (table In five out of 
six important provincial urban centres23 also the share of women in employment rose, but in 
varying degrees (table 2B).24 In COrdoha and Rosario, the two largest and most industrialized 
areas after Buenos Aires, trends are similar to those found in this latter city: the growth of 
women's employment mirrors the decline of manufacturing. Women's presence increased also 
in Neuquën (where one should take into account the substantial presence of women among 
internal migrants to this province that shows a positive in-migration balance) and Tucumán; in 
both cities the large fall in construction employment, traditional absorber of male workers, might 
have contributed to the increase of women's employment share. Overall, growth of female labour 
force participation rates was parallel to the shift of labour demand to trade and service-sector 
activities, prone to employ women, that is examined below. 
At the turn of the 1980s the rate of labour force participation of persons aged 60 and 
over, many of whom were formally retired and receiving pension benefits, increased as a result 
of the sharp fall of retirement pay. In Buenos Aires, for instance, it was higher, for both men 
and women, in 1988-1993 than in The opposite had happened in the late 1970s, 
when some wage earners in retirement age had left economic activity because pension benefits 
had deteriorated somewhat less than wages (Marshall, 1988a). 
The younger age groups did not join the labour market in greater quantities. 
The household survey (INDEC, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares [EPHI) covers, apart from Buenos 
Aires, 24 urban centres, most of which are provincial capitals. The largest centres include their surrounding 
metropolitan area. Of those 24, I selected 2 large urban areas (Cdrdoba and Rosaiio), and four other capital 
cities, representative of distinct economic regions: Corrientes (Northeast), La Rioja (West), Neuqudn 
(Patagonia), Tucumán (Northwest). These regions vary in economic and social structure, role in the overall 
economic, economic dynamism and, in some cases, political leadership. Hereon, observations on the provinces 
refer exclusively to these selected six. 
24 Due to reasons linked to the household survey processing, the tables presenting data for the provincial 
cities start in 1984; trends are representative of the 1980s as a whole. 
" Retirement pay declined steadily from 1984 on; while the largest relative fall was in 1986, pensions 
reached extremely low levels by the early 1990s and, in 1992, they were half of what they had been in 1983 
(data in FIDE, Indicadores de Coyunzura, 1993). In Buenos Aires, the labour force participation rate of persons 
aged 60-69 had been 23.4% and 24.2% in 1984 and 1985, respectively; the figures rose to 28.9% (1988), 
28.7% (1990), 32.8% (1992) and 29.1% (1993). Those aged 70 and over increased their labour force 
participation only in 1993, from the usual 5-6% to 8.5% (data from INDEC, EPH). The same happened in 
Córdoba but not in Rosario. It does not seem to have taken place in the other four provincial cities examined 
here either, but the small number of cases in each category casts some doubt on the results (data from INDEC, 
EPH). 
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Immigration from neighbouring countries tended to fluctuate according to economic 
conditions in Argentina and to variations in the exchange rate. Up to the mid 1970s, 
comparatively more extensive employment opportunities and better wage levels had attracted 
these immigrants to Argentina, while better conditions in its more dynamic areas had been an 
inducement for internal migration. Settlement had been facilitated by a lax policy concerning use 
of state-owned empty urban spaces, that resulted in the expansion of shanty towns. 
After 1976, apart from directly discouraging immigration so as to check the growth of 
unemployment, the military government was intent in eradicating those shanty towns in Buenos 
Aires and impeding new settlements. Several actions taken in this direction deterred immigrants, 
already less inclined to enter Argentina due to the fall in wages and employment, from staying 
(Marshall and Orlansky, 1983). The liberalization of housing rents also contributed to make 
housing more expensive. By contrast, in 1979-81 the over-valued domestic currency provided 
an incentive for temporary immigration. Internal migrants too ceased to come to Buenos Aires 
as employment opportunities decreased and housing became more costly. The result was some 
decrease in the share of internal migrants in the area's At the same time, the 
emigration of Argentines increased (Marshall, 1988c). 
In spite of the more permissive attitude towards shanty towns of the post 1983 civilian 
government, migration did not increase due to the adverse economic conditions. Economic 
decline seemed to suffice to discourage in-migration from the provinces to the earlier industrial 
poles of absorption, although migration to the relatively unpopulated Patagonian provinces, with 
more employment opportunities, In Buenos Aires city proper, the share of internal 
migrants fell in 1980-1991 from 25% to 23%; and in the surrounding metropolitan area, from 
45% to 34% (Population By contrast, immigrants from neighbouring countries 
maintained their share. While in the late 1970s immigration trends had contributed to lessen 
unemployment, their impact in the 1980s is not that clear. But in 1992-93, immigration from 
bordering countries seemed to be on the increase again, further enlarging labour supplies, now 
due to the comparative over-valuation of the Argentinian peso: immigrants are prepared to accept 
According to EPH data in Cortés (1985) internal migrants' EAP share decreased from 39% in 1974 to 
35% in 1981 and 1982. 
27 Data on migration are found in Latles and Sana (1992). 
The 1980 figure does not count as internal migrants those born in the Buenos Aires province or in the 
city of Buenos Aires. 
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low wages in the host country that are high in terms of their national 
2. Labour requirements 
As was the case with the supply of labour, economic policies undoubtedly affected labour 
requirements; again, their impacts intermingled with, and are difficult to separate from, those 
of factors that determine long term changes in the volume and composition of employment. 
Among the labour market effects most obviously associated with economic policies implemented 
after 1976 were the contraction of manufacturing employment as a result of the overvalued 
Argentine currency and opening up of the economy at the end of the 1970s, and the employment 
effects of cuts to state expenditure, rationalization of public enterprises and privatizations.3° 
And, of course, state management of macroeconomic variables and the level of economic activity 
systematically affected overall employment rates. 
In spite of its comparatively small labour surplus by Latin American standards, at each 
of the successive phases of the industrialization process Argentina's economy had operated "as 
ir it had unlimited labour supplies, in the sense that migration made labour continuously 
available to the more dynamic economic centres. Rural stagnation in some provinces and 
agricultural transformation in others generated excess labour. Further, from the 1950s on, labour 
requirements in some sectors tended gradually to fall, and workers were expelled from traditional 
manufacturing industries; together with internal and international migrants, these sources were 
more than enough to satisfy the labour needs of the expanding sectors (Marshall, 1980). In any 
cast, unemployment showed marked fluctuations and reached non-negligible levels during 
economic downturns, and the unemployment rate in large cities (Buenos Aires, COrdoba and 
Rosario) had averaged 6% in the 1960s. 
During the 1970s unemployment tended to decrease (table lA).3' At first, in 1973-1975, 
this was due to employment growth. But later, paradoxically during a period when employment 
was falling in the private and public sectors, unemployment attained very low levels as a result 
No data on international migration are readily available. In 1991, immigrants from border countries 
represented almost 4% of Buenos Aires city's population, and 3.5% of Buenos Aires metropolitan area's 
(Population Census). In early 1994, facilitated by an "amnesty", some 260,000 immigrants from bordering 
countries regularized their situation but there are still many more illegal residents. 
3° Rationalization of state enterprises took place not only in the 1991-93 period but also before (e.g. 
employment in state enterprises fell by more than 25% in the late 1970s). 
The unemployment rate is estimated by the household survey (see above) twice a year in 25 urban 
centres. Following the definition usual internationally, those who did not work in the week of the survey, had 
no job and were actively seeking employment are classified as unemployed. 
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of the above-described withdrawal of certain groups from the labour market (discouraged 
workers, increased retirement) and reduction of immigration from neighbouring countries and 
of internal migration to industrial centres, as well as of the growth of self-employment.32 In the 
initial years of the military regime the government had been keen to maintain unemployment 
low so as to avoid providing further motive for social unrest. To this end, it not only took 
measures to restrict immigration from bordering countries hut also recommended employers not 
to retrench personnel massively. Whatever its causes, in this period unemployment rates were 
moderate in Buenos Aires and the rest of the urban areas; it increased again only with the 198 i- 
82 recession.33 
In the I 980s, in contrast to the growing labour force participation rates noted above, the 
rate of employment relative to the urban population increased only slightly. In 1993 the urban 
employment rate remained at the 1988 level (table 1A). The oscillations of the employment rate 
to some extent reflected GNP retrogressions in 1981-83 and 1985 as well as the 1986 and 1992 
economic improvement.3' As labour demand did not rise in parallel with the labour force, 
unemployment and underemployment rose.35 Unemployment levels tended to exceed those of 
the 1970s, and in 1989, 1992 and, particularly, 1993 they reached high figures (table 1A). 
Economic stagnation and recurrent crises, lack of investment, decline of construction and 
manufacturing activities as well as other changes in the employment structure, and finally some 
improvement in productive efficiency reduced labour requirements in the 1980s, at a time when 
the working force was expanding. The changing composition of unemployment showed the 
impact of labour market restructuring. In the 1980s and early 1990s the proportion of household 
among the unemployed was higher than in the 1970s, and men's unemployment rate tended 
to increase more than women's (table B, Appendix). 
After having reached a peak in 1974-75 (almost 75%), in Buenos Aires the share of wage 
in total employment had tended to fall in the 1980s accompanying the process of economic 
retrogression (table 3A). Its fluctuations were directly associated with those of economic activity. 
In four out of the six provincial urban centres examined here the share of wage employment also 
decreased, remarkably in some (table 3B). As, for reasons I discuss below, the improved 
Full details are in Marshall (1988a). 
" Limited coverage of the unemployed due to relocation of part of the population to the fringe of Buenos 
Aires may have contributed also to downplay the real magnitude of overt unemployment in this city (Marshall, 
1988a). 
The employment rate in Buenos Aires was considerably stable over 1974-93; its oscillations tend to reflect 
those of economic activity (table IA). 
" See also table C, Appendix. 
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economic performance that followed the 1991 policy package was not accompanied by growing 
labour requirements, the share of wage employment in Buenos Aires, after a slight recovery in 
1991-2, dropped again to a level somewhat lower than in 1989, the recessive, hyperinflation year 
(table 3A). 
Already since the late I 970s many of the unemployed had sought refuge in so-called 
"informal" activities and self-employment. Self-employment performed some role in the 
absorption of potential unemployment, although with the deepening of the crisis its absorption 
capacity tended to In Buenos Aires self-employment showed a steady 23% of the 
labour force since 1980, with peaks in 1989-90 and 1993, a figure that exceeds its usual quota 
in the preceding decade. Self-employment, traditionally a relatively prosperous sector, now 
incorporated a sizeable segment with characteristics similar to the precarious, low-income self- 
employ ment widespread in other Latin American countries. 
During the 1980s the level of wage employment increased only slightly. This increase was 
exclusively explained by the service sector (social and personal services and finance), that more 
than compensated for the contraction of employment in manufacturing, mining and construction. 
Manufacturing employment in medium and large firms had declined throughout the 1980s, and 
this trend continued in the early 1990s.3' This process was associated with the long term 
restructuring of manufacturing's composition, as the growing industries were not labour 
absorbing, hut it was exacerbated by Martinez de Hoz' trade liberalization and exchange rate 
policy and by the crises and continued investment decline of the 1980s. Starting in the late 
1970s, the largest manufacturing establishments (with more than 500 workers) expelled labour 
due to plant closures, concentration, rationalization and productivity increases. Were it not for 
some expansion in the number of small and medium-sized establishments that absorbed labour, 
generally under more precarious employment conditions, manufacturing employment would have 
fallen more sharply.38 De-industrialization intensified the "tertiarization" of the employment 
According to the population censuses, the share of self-employment in the country as a whole increased 
the most in the l960s and continued to increase thereafter at a slower rhythm. See also table C, Appendix. 
Manufacturing employment (1970=100): 1980=88.2, 1990=62.6; (1990=100): 1992=94.0; 
1993=92.3 (INDEC, Encuesta Industnal; 1993, preliminary figures). 
Economic Census, 1974 and 1985. In this period, the number of manufacturing establishments with 6 to 
100 employees increased, while those with over 100 workers fell. Employment increased in establishments of all 
sizes within the range 6-500 employees, but declined in those with more than 500 workers; the highest rates of 
increase were in those with 6 to 25, while employment growth in establishments with 101-500 workers was very 
slight. Net manufacturing employment creation between 1973 and 1984 was only of some 40,000 jobs 
(Economic Census, 1974 and 1985). Productivity growth was associated more with organizational rationalization 
than with technological change (Kosacoff, 1989). There was some decentralization of manufacturing 
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structure that had began in the 1960s. The opening up of the economy since 1991, combined 
with the fixed exchange rate, with efforts at raising productivity and efficiency by catching up 
with more modem, labour-saving technologies and work methods, and with the deepening of 
economic concentration, to shrink manufacturing employment. The rapid growth of 
manufacturing exports since the late I 980s was unable to generate sufficient employment to offset 
those negative effects.39 
In Buenos Aires, the main industrial centre, the share of manufacturing in wage 
employment plummeted from 41% in 1974 to 32% in 1984, 28% in 1990, and, despite recovery, 
to 26.4% in 1993; increasing shares were found in trade, social and personal services, and to 
a lesser extent transportation and finance, real estate and business services. Construction failed 
to absorb more workers despite occasional recoveries in building activities. In COrdoba and 
Rosario, where manufacturing had been relatively important, its share also declined. In all six 
provincial cities the weight of social and personal services increased, but the behaviour of the 
remaining economic activities was determined by each province's specific features (e.g. extent 
of state employment, importance of tourism, availability of resources such as oil, access to 
industrial promotion schemes, etc.).4° 
Promotion of temporary employment under the 1991 employment law did not succeed in 
stimulating employment creation; according to official estimates only 12,000 contracts were made 
in 1992 in the framework of that law ("Argentina en crecimiento", op. cit. :27). In Buenos Aires, 
the unemployment rate in manufacturing had been 3% in 1984, mounted to about 9% in the 
1989-90 recession, and neared 10% in 1993 (INDEC, InformaciOn de Prensa; May and October, 
1993) at a time when manufacturing activity was relatively booming. Unemployment in 
construction traditionally explained fluctuations in the overall unemployment rate. Since 1982 
it has been a two-digit figure with peaks in 1989 and 1993 (16% in October 1993). Also in trade 
unemployment practically doubled between 1992 and 1993. The dramatic increase (3.7%, 6.7 % 
and 14.5% in 1991, 1992 and 1993, respectively) in unemployment in household service is worth 
reporting, as it matched the growth of women's labour force participation at a time when, 
employment away from the traditional industrial centres as a result of state industrial promotion schemes. 
The incidence of import penetration and negative trade balances on the employment levels of different 
manufacturing industries during 1991-93 deserves investigation. Preliminary assessment suggested that some 
were adversely affected by import penetration (their output declined), but others were not, and even in some of 
the cases where output was maintained or increased employment fell as a result of internal reorganization and/or 
improved efficiency. The largest employment losses were found in the industrial groups "textiles, clothing and 
leather" and, particularly, "basic metals" (data from [NDEC, Encuesta Industrial). 
4° See tables Dl and D2, Appendix. Trends in the economic structure of the self-employed are similar to 
those described for wage employment. 
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according to anecdotal evidence, middle-income households seem to be reducing their demand 
for domestic service.4' The deterioration of the labour market situation was reflected also by 
the sharp increase in 1993 of the proportion of unemployed workers that have been out of work 
for more than three months: 27% in 1992, 43% in 1993 (INDEC, EPH). Further, the growth 
of involuntary part-time work, with peaks of about 9% in 1990 and 1993 (as against 6% in 
1983), shows the poor quality of available jobs.42 
Since 1990 unemployment was affected also by the reduction in state employment, from 
close to 1,876 thousands in 1989 to 1,609 thousands in 1992 (-14%), including the employment 
losses which ensued from privatization of state-owned large enterprises.43 In certain areas of 
the public sector such as public administration, voluntary quits, advance retirement and 
elimination of temporary contracts, among other measures, contributed to reduce personnel, 
while at the same time there was an important number of new recruits (Orlansky, But 
on balance, and counting privatizations and the shift of personnel to the provincial public sector 
due to the decentralization of secondary education, employment in the national state diminished 
(-52% in 1990-92); this was not the case with provincial public employment that increased 19% 
in the same period as it inter alia absorbed personnel formerly employed by the national state 
(IDEP (1993: table 53). Privatizations generally were accompanied by personnel reductions - 
through dismissals and incentives to voluntary quits -, either before the enterprise was sold or 
after. Between 1989 and 1993 employment in public enterprises and banks (330,000 in 1989) was 
halved due to privatizations (Orlansky, 1993). In certain smaller cities, the effects of privatization 
spread throughout the community, wholly dependent on consumption of workers so far employed 
by the state enterprise. 
Additional factors may have played a minor role in explaining, in some urban areas, the 
jump in open unemployment rates in 1993. Intensified control of compliance with employment 
registration and labour obligations might have been followed by dismissal of clandestine 
employees in certain, "visible" sectors, as their employment became more expensive. At the 
Sectoral unemployment rates are based on last job held by workers with previous employment. Although 
some of these unemployed workers might have quit their jobs voluntarily or might have been dismissed long 
before the time of the survey, these rates provide some estimate of layoff rates. 
42 Average rate of underemployment for the 25 urban areas (INDEC, EPH, October). 
According to the population census of 1980, public sector employment absorbed 16.1 % of the EAP and 
represented 22.6% of total wage employment. By 1986 the figures were estimated to be only slightly higher, 
16.7% and 23,3%, respectively (Orlansky, 1989). 
"In Buenos Aires, the unemployment rate in public administration more than doubled between 1991 and 
1992, but in 1993 it decreased again (INDEC, Lnformacidn de Prensa, October, 1993). 
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same time, enforcement of tax obligations might have curtailed further the already low 
profitability of certain low-income own-account activities; these self-employed workers might 
have started to look for wage employment, joining the ranks of the unemployed. 
The potential dampening effects of unemployment on wages and working conditions were 
not really cushioned by income protection schemes. The unemployment compensation scheme, 
created in 1991, covered only a small segment of the unemployed at the national level (10% in 
J993),45 owing probably to the rather restrictive criteria to qualify for compensation.46 This 
notwithstanding, between 1992 and 1993 the number of subsidies granted increased by more than 
500%, as unemployment expanded and more people applied as information on the existence of 
the compensation scheme spread. 
WAGES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
The interpretation put forward in this paper is that institutional factors, namely state 
intervention, played a major role in the determination of the growth of inequality. The massive 
upward redistribution of income that started in 1976 was implemented through wage and labour 
policy, and determined a pattern of income distribution that still prevailed 18 years later, in 
1993. Such upward shift did not lead to sustained growth but rather stagnation and the debt 
crisis, the labour market impact of which (fall of labour requirements, growing unemployment, 
weak trade unions), together with the wage policies of later governments, preserved and even 
intensified the degree of inequality achieved during 1976-1982. The new upsurge of high 
inflation from mid 1987 aggravated income concentration, and explains the inequality peak of 
1989. State control of retirement pensions further deteriorated from 1987 onwards the share of 
the poorest 30%, where the retired have a substantial weight.47 
The proportion varied by province between a maximum of 19% and a minimum of 3% (FIEL, 
Jndicadores de Coyunzura, 12, 1993). 
Inter alia: rural, household and public administration workers were not entitled to compensation; 
construction workers qualified for a different scheme; workers should have been dismissed unfairly or due to 
force rnajeure, contributed to the fund during 12 months in the three latest years (with specific conditions for 
agency labour), and been registered by their employers. Besides, length of compensation was linked to the 
duration of contributions to the fund. 
The retired and other non-economically active income recipients arc included in overall individual income 
distributions, as these refer to all income earners. According to FIDE (Coyunzura y Desarrollo, 1989), in 1985 
the non economically active earning some income (about 80% of whom were retired or pensioners) accounted 
for 51.2% of the population in the 40% poorest income class, and 47.2% in 1988 (EPH data). 
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Despite oscillations partially associated with trends in GNP and in real wages,48 between 
1977 and 1993 a more uneven pattern of income distribution, as compared with that which had 
prevailed by the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, seems to have stabilized (tables 4A and 4B). 
Even though in the supposedly better times of 1991-93 inequality slightly diminished in 
comparison with the crisis years, the shape of income distribution was worse than in the mid 
1980s. The inequality peak of 1989 is a singular point in an otherwise stable pattern. The 
distribution of income of the employed population too remained quite stable between 1988 and 
with minor gains for the poorest 60%, and minor losses for the rest (table 
Between 1950 and 1975 real wages had remained at an approximately constant level. The 
relatively strong trade unions generally had been able to preserve the purchasing power of wages, 
while the pressure of excess labour prevented them from raising wages pan passu with growing 
manufacturing productivity. The decreed wage freeze of 1976 resulted in a decline of about 30%, 
and, despite some occasional improvements, this loss was not to be recovered. Real wages 
improved in 1984 when in its first year the constitutional government implemented redistributive 
measures, and again in 1985-86 with the favourable impact of the Plan Austral on the inflation 
rate, but later, even though free wage bargaining was allowed since 1988, wages receded as 
rapid inflation was added to unemployment growth and weaker trade unions (table 4A). Labour's 
share in GNP also fell after 1976 (table A2, Appendix). The 1991 stabilization plan's success 
in arresting inflation contributed to some recovery in wage earners' purchasing capacity over that 
of the immediately preceding years; free wage bargaining helped, although trade union 
subordination to the state through cooptation of the main trade union leaders favoured a passive 
attitude in relation to lost income. This notwithstanding, in a longer-term perspective, and also 
in comparison with mid 1980s rates, real wages remained at a very low level (table 4A). Still, 
while between 1976 and 1990 labour costs had lagged behind productivity growth,5' in 1992 
Fall of wages in 1977-78, and again in 1987-89, affected the second poorest 30% more than the next 
30% (waged workers are somewhat more concentrated in these two strata), but both lost some of their income 
share. 
Data on income distribution of the employed population according to main job are available as from 
1988. 
5° The distributions of total household income and per capita household income follow approximately the 
same trend as the distribution of individual income (data from INDEC, EPH). 
Real manufacturing wages (deflated by CPI; at that time trends in consumer and wholesale prices 
resembled each other) fell annually -1.6% in 1976-89 while manufacturing productivity (per hour) increased by 
2.8% (see Marshall, 1993a). Labour costs in manufacturing had fallen -5.1% annually in 1981-85, and 
increased 1.0% per year in 1986-90, while in the same periods productivity (per worker) had declined -3.2% 
and risen 1.4%, respectively (unpublished estimates from Ministeno de Trabajo y Seguridad Social). 
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labour's income share in manufacturing industry exceeded that of 1980; even though real wages 
remained low, manufacturing wholesale prices rose more slowly than the CPI since 1990, and 
in addition wage costs increased faster than productivity.52 
From the mid 1970s wages fell hut earnings out of profits did not. This is evidenced by 
the rise of the income share of the 10th richest population decile in 1977 to a higher level about 
which it stabilized in the longer-term. Those in the top decile were either non wage earners or 
managers and executives, often professionals (38.6% of wage earners in this income class, and 
34.0% non wage earners, had completed university education), in banking and finance (strongly 
over-represented in this income class), manufacturing and certain services.53 
The foregoing describes the evolution of income distribution in Buenos Aires and its 
metropolitan area. Income distribution patterns in other cities were similar to that found in 
Buenos Aires, although there are some differences in trends among the other six urban areas 
examined, that reflect diversity in local economic and political contexts (table In the early 
1990s, for instance, flow of funds with political aims (Corrientes), growth of public sector 
employment (La Rioja), closing down of large factories (COrdoba, Rosario) might all have 
affected distribution patterns. 
The growth of income concentration after 1976 was determined not only by the reduction 
of wages vis-à-vis earnings out of profits but also reflected the increase in inequality in the 
distributions of both wage income and the income of the self-employed.55 Given the importance 
of .wage labour in the employment structure the changes in the distribution of wage income 
Notoriously, the price of commercialization and private services increased much more than manufacturing 
prices, and this is reflected by the CPI, which is the standard of reference for wage change. Between 1990 and 
1992 manufacturing labour costs per unit rose by 9% (on the basis of productivity per worker; Ministerio de 
Trabajo y Seguridad Social, unpublished). Labour's share in manufacturing was estimated in 38.8% in 1980, 
34.5% in 1990, and 40.6% in 1992 (ibid.). Owing to the fixed exchange rate, in the same period unit labour 
costs in dollars increased even more, contributing to erode the competitiveness of Argentine manufactures. The 
1993 decreed rebates of payroll taxes in manufacturing firms was expected to offset at this partially such 
increase in labour costs (payroll taxes represented 33% of the manufacturing wage bill). 
INDEC, EPH, October 1988. There is consensus on the fact that income concentration is underestimated 
by EPH data as underdeclaration by highest-income classes is widespread. 
Comparable data were made available as from 1984. 
" On wage income and income from self-employment see Beccaria (1991), but distributions are not shown. 
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should have had a substantial effect on the overall distribution of individual income.56 
Between 1950 and the mid 1970s, the above described "fluid" labour market situation 
(that did not favour wage competition to attract workers), as well as the intervention of trade 
unions (that spread wage increases "downwards") and of the state (which decreed uniform and 
flat-rate wage increases) had tended to mitigate the widening of wage differentials across sectors 
and occupations that accompanies the differentiation in production situations, in particular, the 
process of industrial diversification (Marshall, 1978 and 1980). 
Later, in the long period from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s, there was a widening 
of differentials between wages of manual workers and employees with little skill, and salaries 
of professional and highly skilled non manual personnel, managers and executives, as well as 
between wages of comparable jobs in different types of firms (Marshall, 1985; Beccaria, 
Similarly, owing to attempts at cutting down public expenditure, after 1988 public 
sector wages increasingly lagged behind those in the private sector, while salaries in banking 
continued to improve vis-ä-vis the rest. This greater differentiation surely helps to explain the 
growth of inequality, but on the whole the increase of wage dispersion across manufacturing 
industries and economic sectors was not spectacular (Marshall, 1994). 
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY 
The taxation reforms (i.e. tax exemptions to distributed profits, increase and 
generalization of the VAT, social security fmancing reform) undertaken by the military 
government furthered income concentration and curtailed workers' disposable income. Social 
expenditure was no longer used as a mechanism of downward income redistribution. Even though 
real social (education, health and housing) expenditure and its share of GNP did not decline, the 
latter averaging 7% in both 1970-75 and this did not help arresting the growing 
deterioration of the social infrastructure and services.59 
It is worth noting that wage earners represented 71.3% of the 1-3 poorest employed population deciles, 
78.8% of the following 30%, 76.3% of the next 30%, and 62.4% of the richest 10% (Buenos Aires, 1988; 
INDEC, EPH). 
" According to Beccaria (1991), the latter was the most imporlant factor in accounting for the increase of 
inequality in the distribution of wage income. 
Data on the consolidated public sector from Secretaria de Hacienda. Other, minor, welfare programmes 
arc not considered here. 
See Marshall (1988a) for a detailed analysis of this period. 
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Tax policies that followed the return to the democratic regime, designed to augment fiscal 
revenues and to ease the deficit of the retirement pension system, did not alter the regressive 
structure of government revenues and did not moderate the growth of inequality. The slight 
increase of state social expenditure (education, health and housing),6° to an average of 8.3% 
of GNP in 1984-88 (Vargas de Flood and Harriague, 1993), did not improve the provision and 
quality of social services. In addition, the erosion of the social security system (particularly the 
retirement scheme and family allowances) was notorious. Revenues of the public retirement 
scheme declined with wages and employment,6' and in 1983-89 the level of pensions went down 
much more than any other remuneration. The coverage of the obras sociales did not decrease (in 
Buenos Aires, it had been only 27% in 1970, rose to 61% in 1980, and was 64% in the capital 
city and 58% in its metropolitan district in hut the system's deficit expanded 
considerably to the detriment of the quality of health services. 
The changes introduced in the tax system after 1991 and the tougher policy against 
evasion increased tax revenues. But, while elimination of the so-called inflationary tax had a 
progressive that of tax reforms intensified regressiveness as a result of the 
generalization and increase of the VAT. Subsequently, the weight of indirect taxation in total tax 
revenues (including payroll taxes), already very substantial (59.4% in 1990), rose to 64.3% in 
Trends in state social spending in 1990-93 reflected the tight stand in relation to public 
expenditure. Although the GNP share of social security expenditure increased in 1990-92 from 
5.9% to 6.7%, expenditure on education, health and housing all together was 7.6% in 1989 and 
7.5 % in 1990-92 (Vargas de Flood and Harriague, 1993). Figures from the state budget of 1993 
envisaged a raise to 8.3% in social security but 7.4% for education, health and housing. The 
reform of the public retirement pension scheme approved in 1993 had the objective of reducing 
its scope, tending to the privatization of social security, as described above. Despite the increase 
60 Other, comparatively minor, social programmes, among which the national food plan created in 1984 and 
the nutritional programmes for school children, were not counted here. 
61 In 1985-1990, revenues from personal and employer taxes for the state retirement pension scheme (once 
employer payroll taxes had been reinstated) were lower than in 1980 (CEPAL; at constant prices). 
Data from Encuesta de utilización de servicios y gasto en atención médica, Ministeno de Salud Ptiblica, 
1982 and from PRONATASS (n.d.). 
According to official estimates, in 1990 the inflationary tax "pressure" on the poorest 20% of the 
population was three times its impact on the highest income 20% ("Argentina en creci,nienio", op. cit.: table 5). 
On the basis of data in Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (1991), and FIDE, Coyunturay 
Desarroio, 1993. 
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of social security expenditure, the level of the minimum benefit, received by 59% of the 
fell even further and was the pervasive object of social demands; in 1992 minimum 
benefits showed the lowest level since 1980; they had been equivalent to 33% of the 
manufacturing wage in 1980 but to 22% in 1992. In the light of the foregoing, 1990-1993 trends 
in state social expenditure and taxation at best did not alter, at worst intensified, the degree of 
inequality in income distribution. 
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
As in other Latin American economies, in Argentina too wages fell and inequality 
increased in the 1980s. But these trends started well before the debt crisis and subsequent so- 
called Nadjustmentw policies. The initial large upward income transfer was the outcome of the 
views and deliberate policies of the military government of the late 1970s. This new distribution 
pattern was to prevail from then onward, and was still quite the same in 1993. Therefore the 
growth of inequality cannot be attributed mainly to economic restrictions. During the 1980s, in 
a period when stabilization was the primary goal of economic policy, inequality remained at a 
higher level than in the past as a result not only of structural economic constraints but also of 
policy choices, and reached new peaks exacerbated by the crisis and hyperinflation. 
It was argued in this paper that the worsening of income distribution is explained, first 
and foremost, by state wage restraints and fiscal policies; second, by the growth of the labour 
surplus and weakening of trade unions; and third by spiralling inflation, that in certain periods 
exacerbated income concentration. 
State income and labour policies, derived mainly from the successive governments' 
conceptions on the economic role of wages, had a direct impact on the shape of income 
distribution. This was particularly the case with the period 1976-1982, but to an important extent 
explains also distributional outcomes in 1985-1987 as well as in 1991-1993. In the military 
government's period the reduction of labour costs had been perceived as a precondition for 
growth. In 1985-1987 (with the Radical party in government) wage policy was based on the 
notions that increased consumption out of wages would overheat the economy unleashing 
inflationary pressures, and that it would bring about balance-of-payment difficulties. Finally, in 
1991-93, once the Plan de Convertibildad was launched by Menem's government, again 
prevailed the notion that a wage raise would trigger rapid price increases, and that higher labour 
costs would erode further the already scarcely competitive position of Argentine manufactures 
in the world market. In this period, central aspects of the economic programme seem to have 
65 Data from Secretarfa de Seguridad Social in Anuario EszadIsfico de Ia Repüblica Argentina, Buenos Aires, 
1993. Some 56% of the retired with the minimum benefit had been self-employed workers. 
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restricted the options for reversing income distribution patterns. Trade liberalization and the fixed 
exchange rate precluded wage increases in the private sector, fiscal control limited growth of 
public sector wages and of pensions, and the adoption of a more regressive taxation structure 
tended to reinforce inequality. 
It has been possible for the state to implement wage restraints not only, as in 1976-1982, 
by concomitantly repressing trade union activity, but also because in the 1980s and early 1990s 
labour market trends were unfavourahie to workers. In 19871990 in particular, only those who 
could rapidly adjust their prices did not lose income or lost less than the rest; wage earners and 
pensioners, with relatively "fixed" incomes, were among the main losers in the hyperinflationary 
period. Trade unions, weakened by mounting unemployment and underemployment, were unable 
to obtain wage increases that would parallel the hectic evolution of the consumer price index. 
From 1991, with the new programme that succeeded in checking price growth, unemployment 
nonetheless continued to expand; again, weak and divided trade unions (and coopted trade union 
leaders) were not able to really challenge the real wages status quo. 
It was contended also in this paper that labour market trends themselves were affected by 
economic policies. In the years 199 1-1993, for instance, the negative labour market effects seem 
to be imbedded in the economic strategy: while certain components of the policy package 
contributed to check the growth of labour demand (e.g. trade liberalization's and convertibility's 
adverse impacts on manufacturing employment; employment declines as a result of the "state 
reform"), at the same time some measures tended to stimulate the increase of the supply of 
labour (i.e. low wages and unemployment of adult males intensified the labour force participation 
rates of women; the exchange rate fostered immigration). 
The years 1991-93 were a transitional period between the structural crisis and the 
expected strengthening of a new growth model. This period witnessed fast economic reconversion 
fostered by drastic change in policy. It is uncertain how long this transitional period may last, 
whether it will effectively lead to sustained economic growth, and whether, in this case, labour 
market conditions and the pattern of income distribution will improve or, instead, an ample 
labour surplus and strong inequality will crystallize as permanent features of Argentine society. 
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Table IA. Urban rates of labour force participation, 










1974 107.5 108.3 -- 108.8 3.4 2.4 
1975 106.4 107.2 -- 107.7 3.8 2.8 
1976 103.7 104.3 -- 103.3 4.4 4.0 
1977 103.5 103.7 -- 104.7 2.7 2.3 
1978 104.6 106.4 -- 107.7 2.3 1.9 
1979 102.9 105.1 -- 106.3 2.4 2.1 
1980 103.2 104.8 -- 105.8 2.5 2.3 
1981 102.7 104.3 -- 102.5 5.3 5.0 
1982 103.2 104.5 -- 103.9 4.6 3.7 
1983 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 3.9 3.1 
1984 101.6 102.4 101.1 101.9 4.4 3.6 
1985 102.4 103.5 100.3 101.6 5.9 4.9 
1q86 103.7 106.7 102.5 105.2 5.2 4.5 
1987 104.3 106.7 102.5 104.4 5.7 5.2 
1988 105.6 108.0 103.3 105.2 6.1 5.7 
1989 105.4 108.8 102.0 104.4 7.1 7.0 
1990 104.6 107.5 102.0 104.4 6.3 6.0 
1991 105.9 108.8 103.6 106.3 6.0 5.3 
1992 107.8 111.2 104.5 107.2 7.0 6.7 
1993 109.9 115.5 103.6 107.7 9.3 9.6 
I Refers to all 25 urban areas covered by the survey, 
including Buenos Aires (GBA) 
b Rate of employment relative to population 
C Unemployment rate relative to EAP 
Source: INDEC, EPH (October). 
Table lB. Employment rate, Buenos Aires, 1980-1993 
employment rate: 
total 15-&4 women 
I 
1980 38.4 59.3 371 
1981 37.2 56.8 36.1 
'1982 37.7 57.8 36.9 
1983 j 36.3 56.5 34.7 1 
1984 37.OA 59.5 36.4 
1985 36.9N 57.5N 37.7N 
1986 38.2N 59.2N 40.5N 
1987 37.9 59.0 40.1 
1988 38.2 59.3 41.3 
1989 37.9 60.6 40.9 
1990 37.9 60.0 42.3 
1991 38.6 59.9 41.7 
1992 38.9 60.1 42.9 
1993 39.1 59.1 42.4 
A April 
N November 
Source: INDEC, EPH (October). 
Table 2A, Selected characteristics of the labour force, Buenos Aires, 1984-1993 
1984 1985 1988 1990 1992 1993 
in EAP 7.0 6.7 7.1 7.0 7.9 7.2 
% 20-24 in EAP 14.3 12.6 13.7 12.1 13.2 13.9 
% women in: EAP 33.7 34.1 36.7 36.4 36.7 38.5 
employed 33.5 34.2 36.5 36.2 36.8 37.3 
wage earners nd nd 37.5 36.8 38.0 38.6 
% not household heads in: 
EAP 48.3 47.8 48.2 47.9 50.0 51.5M 
employed 47.7 46.9 46.9 46.7 48.9 49.1 
wage earners 50.0 49.8 50.0 50.2 52.6 53.1 
A April M May 
Table 2B. Labour force characteristics in selected urban areas. 1984 and 1992 
Córdoba Rosario Corrientes La Rioja Neuquén Tucumán 
1984 1992 1984 1992 1984 1992 1984 1992 1984 1992 1984 1992 
women in 
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Source: INDEC, EPH (October). 
TABLE 3A. Share of wage employmcnt* in 
Buenos Aircs, 1974-1993 (%) 





















TABLE 3B. Share of wage employmcnt* 
in selected urban areas, 1984 and 1992 (%) 
1984 1992 
Buenos Aires 70.9 70.0 
Córdoha 67.2 65.9 
Rosario 62.4 57.8 
Corrientes 77.8 71.8 
La Rioja 77.9 77.0 
Neuquén 76.2 73.2 
Tucumán 70.3 64.4 
* Total emioyment excludes those whose employment 
status was unknown 
Source: INDEC, EPH (October). 
Table 4A. GNP per capita, real wages and thc distribution of individual income,* 1974-1993. 
ON? 
% 
Real bourly wages 
owsufaciuriag 
too 
Income share i 
Bucnes Aires (%) 
30%pssaea 30% 30% I0%rscbca 
1974 36 132.4 11,3 224 38.2 28.0 
1975 -2 2 343 11 4 224 386 276 
1976 - 6 94.9 12 -- -- 
1977 47 81 2 10.9 18.9 36.4 33.7 
978 -48 770 102 179 35.8 36.1 
1979 53 88.9 -- -- -- -- 
1980 -0.1 99.0 — — — — 
1981 -8.2 92.8 105 18.7 35.8 35.0 
1982 -6.5 80.6 10.8 196 36.0 33.6 
1983 1.3 100.0 10.2 19.9 37.0 32.8 
1984 1.0 127.1 10.2 20.3 36.3 33.2 
1983 -5.7 III 6 10.0 19.4 373 33.3 
98.6 4.7 105.2 1162b 
1987 0.8 97.2 9,1 18.5 36.3 36.0 
198* -4.0 93.3 101 4b 17.9 36.9 35.9 
1989 -5.8 80,6 82,0k' 7.9 15.7 34.8 41.6 
1990 -1.4 78,7 9.7 19 I 36.0 35.2 
1991 4.1 87ob 9.5 11.4 357 363 
1992 — u, 1b 9.0 19.4 37 2 344 
1993 — -- 869k 89 194 37.1 346 
* Refers to all income earners 
Data presented in Beccaria (1991). 
This series, among other changes, refers so monthly wages deflated by the average of CPIs of 
same and next months, while the 1974-90 series refers to wages deflated by the CPI of the same 
month 
Average three first quarters 
Source: CEPAL (GNP per capita and real wages); INDEC, EPH, October (income distribution; 
distributions for 1974-1985 were kind'y made available by L. Beccaria). 
Table 4B. Degree of inequality of 
individual income* distribution. 













* Refers to all income earners 
Source: own estimates on the 
basis of LNDEC, EPH (October). 
Table 5. Buenos Aires. Distribution of personal income of the employed population according to population 
deciles, 1988-1993 
(percentages) 
income class I-Ill 
poorest 
V-Vt Vil-IX X 
richest 
1988 9.5 19.7 37.7 33.3 
1990 10.5 20.5 35.9 33.0 
1991 11.2 20.4 35.8 32.5 
1992 11.5 20.3 36.3 32.1 
1993 11.0 20.3 36.2 32.4 
Source: INDEC, EPH (October). 
Table 6. Distribution of individual income, selected cities, 
1984 and 1992 (percentages) 




























































































Source: 1NDEC. EPH (October). 
TABLE Al. Gross Domestic Product and Selected Macroeconomic Variables, 1980-1993 
GDP S mfg. 
gdp S 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) CPI 
980 10331.2 2890.4 78.3 22.5 4.1 26.6 2.3 -4.9 -1.5 7.5 5.4 
981 9737.8 2544.1 80.2 19.2 4.4 23.6 3.1 -3.8 -3.7 13.3 7.2 
982 9431.2 2475.8 78.1 17.9 2.5 20.4 1.2 1.5 -5.2 15.1 9.9 
983 9783.3 2658.3 78.4 16.9 2.6 19.5 1.4 2.1 -6.1 15.1 15.0 
984 9962.2 2728.6 79.9 15.9 2.6 18.5 2.2 1.6 -6.4 11.9 18.8 
985 9303.3 2458.4 79.8 15.2 1.1 16.3 1.3 3.9 -6.2 5.4 14.1 
986 9984.1 2737.6 80.7 14.7 2.7 17.5 0.0 1.8 -4.6 4.1 5.1 
987 10241.8 2785.7 79.7 15.8 3.8 19.5 .0.3 0.7 -4.2 5.0 8.8 
988 10049.1 2650.1 77.5 18.5 1.1 19.5 0.7 3.0 -4.7 6.0 14.1 
1989 9424.3 2461.2 79.3 15.9 -0.2 15.7 1.4 5.0 -6.2 3.8 38.6 
990 9430.4 2511.5 78.9 17.3 -3.1 14.2 0.4 6.9 -4.3 3.8 24.9 
1991 10270.0 2810.8 81.6 14.9 1.4 16.3 0.3 2.1 -3.8 1.6# 5.2 
1992 11158.7 3017.0 83.2 13.4 6.2 19.6 0.0 -3.2 -2.9 0.1# 1.4 
1993 11832.0 3152.8 82.9 14.8 6.3 21.0 0.1 -3.9 -2.4 0.1# 0.6 





Effect terms of exchange 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net external payments; deflated by price index of imports 
Fiscal deficit (from 1985. national public sector) 
1: Consumer price index (monthly % rate of change) 
rDP at market prices, in thousands; 1986 prices; revised estimates by the Central Bank (BCRA). 
lished April. 1993. 
.stimated on the basis of budget laws; this does not always coincide with the real fiscal deficit. 
Irce: CEPAL. lndicadores Macroecondnucos do Ia Argentina, Buenos Aires, October 1991 and May 1994 
to revision). 
TABLE A2. Labour share, 1970-1989 (percents) 
(1) (2) 
1970 43 43 
43 44 
1972 40 41 
1973 43 44 
1974 45 45 
1975 43 40 
1976 30 25 
1977 25 26 
1978 28 33 
1979 31 34 
1980 35 39 
1981 33 38 
1982 22 26 
1983 29 34 
1984 36 40 
1985 32 38 
1986 35 44 
1987 33 37 
1988 29 32 
Source: Estimates by FIDE (1) and Beccaria and 
Orsatti (2) on the share of wages (i.e. excluding 
payroll taxes) in GDP, cited in Beccaria (1991). 
TABE.E B. Labour force participation and unemployment rates by sex. 
Buenos Aires. 1974-1993 (percents) 
I.FPR tJnernploment 
total women men tiolal women men 
1974 40.5 24.8 58.0 2.4 4.1 l.6 
1975 40.2 23.8 58.2 2.8 4.4 2.1 
1976 39.1 23.7 56.5 4.0 7.3 2.5 
1977 38.9 23.8 55.6 2.3 4.4 1.4 
1978 39.9 25.7 55.6 1.9 3.0 1.3 
1979 39.4 25.1 55.0 2.1 2.7 1.7 
1980 39.3(61.1) 24.7(38.4) 55.2(84.8) 2.3 3.4 1.8 
1981 39.1(59.8) 25.0(38.1) 54.4(83.9) 5.0 5.3 4.9 
1982 39.2(59.8) 25.3(38.7) 54.5(83.9) 3.7 4.5 3.3 
1983 37.5(58.4) 23.0(36.2) 53.2(82.4) 3.1 4.0 2.7 
1984 38.4(59.9) 24.4(38.1) 53.4(83.5) 3.6 4.4 3.2 
1985 25.5(39.51 52.9(83.0) 4.9 4.6 5.0 
1986 40.0(62.0) 27.5(42.7) 53.7(83.8) 4.5 5.0 4.2 
1987 40.0(62.1) 27.5(42.7) 53.8(83.6) 5.2 6.4 4.5 
1988 40.5(62.8) 28.4(44.2) 53.7(83.3) 5.7 6.4 5.3 
1989 40.8(63.0) 27.9(44.1) 54.2(83.5) 7.0 7.2 6.9 
1990 40.3(63.9) 27.9(45.2) 53.4(84.1) 6.0 6.5 5.7 
1991 40.8(63.3) 28.0(44.3) 55.1(83.6) 5.3 5.9 4.9 
1992 41.7(64.4) 29.3(45.9) 55.2(84.5) 6.7 6.3 6.9 
1993 43.3(65.6) 31.9(48.5) 55.6(84.)) 9.6 12.4 7.9 
Note. Between brackets: LFPR of population aged 15-64. 
Source: INDEC, EPH (October). 
TABLE C. Population of working age: share of the economically active, the 
employed and unemployed, and the self-employed, Buenos Aires, 1984, 1988 
and 1993 
(percents of total population aged 15 or over). 
1984 1988 1993 
EAP 53.0 55.5 57.9 
employed 51.1 52.4 52.4 
unemployed 1.9 3.1 5.5 
[ 
10.7 11.3 12.7 
* Included in 'employed' 
Source: INDEC, EN-I (October). 
Table Dl. Economic structure of wage employment, Buenos Aires, 1984-1993 
(percentages) 
1984 1988 1990 1992 1993M 
Manufacturing 32.5 29.9 28.0 27.0 27.0 
Construction 4.3 5.0 3.4 4.0 4.0 
Trade, hotels, 
restaurants 12.9 15.1 14.5 16.5 15.9 
Transportation 
communicat. 7.1 7.3 7.6 7.5 8.1 
Finance, real estate, 
insur., business serv. 
7.1 8.8 7.7 7.9 7.3 
Social and 
personal services 
33.5 32.6 36.7 35.3 35.7 
M May 
Structure of wage employment according to sex 
Buenos Aires, 1988 








men 35.0 7.7 16.2 10.4 8.3 20.5 
women 21.4 0.5 13.3 2.2 9.6 52.7 
Note: Activities not shown in these tables are: agriculture; mining; electricity, 
gas and water, and a tiny number of unknown. 
Source: INDEC, EPH (October). 
Table D2. Economic structure of wage employment 
Selected urban centres, 1984 and 1992 
(percentages) 








































































































Noe: The 'unknown' were not subtracted in 1984. but they 
at most 1%. and generally less, of wage earners. 
Rest of activities are not shown in this table. 
Source: INDEC, EPH (October). 
IDRC / CR01 
I 111111 11111 11111 11111 11111 11111 liii liii 
308085 
TABLE E. Structure of GDP,* 1980-1992 
(percents) 
1980 1985 1990 1992 
Agriculture 6.9 8.4 8.9 7.8 
Mining 2.2 2.3 2.7 2.3 
Manufacturing 28.0 26.4 26.6 27.0 
Electr., Gas., Water. 1.5 2.0 2.1 1.9 
Construction 8.1 5.3 4.5 5.6 
Trade, hotels., restaur. 17.8 16.5 15.5 16.7 
Transport., communicat. 4.0 4.7 5.0 5.0 
Finance, insur., real est 14.2 15.3 15.0 15.7 
Social & personal services 16.7 19.1 20.2 17.0 
* GDP at 1986 prices 
Source: BCRA, Estirnaciones anuales de Ia oferta y demanda globales, perIodo 1980-1992, 
Buenos Aires, April, 1993. 
